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Abstract
 
Over the past decade, there has been a major shift in Dutch gender equality policy to an almost
exclusive focus on migrant women. Simultaneously, the focus of  ‘minority policies’ has shifted more
and more towards gender relations. The appearance of  migrant women at the top of  the political
agenda is remarkable. In this article we examine how this construction of  migrant women as a
political problem has come about, and consider its implications. As we argue, the dominant policy
frames of  emancipation and individual responsibility are reinforcing a dichotomy between the
autochthonous ‘us’ and the allochthonous ‘them’. As the problem is increasingly defined as a
cultural one, it is implicitly stated that there is no problem with the dominant culture and society.
Barriers for participation are exclusively located in the migrant (Muslim) culture. In this view,
Muslim migrants should first change their culture before they can fully integrate in Dutch society.
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Introduction
 
Throughout the 
 

 
s gender equality and multiculturalism were seen as
compatible policy goals. In both policy logics diversity was proclaimed as an
important value.
Multiculturalism as a policy goal and project has, however, increasingly
come under attack ( Joppke 
 

 
; Kofman 
 

 
). It has been contested as
essentialist and reifying cultural groups. Others have pointed to the danger
of  cultural separatism and segregation. From a feminist perspective it has
been argued that there is a tension between multiculturalism and gender
equality (Okin 
 

 
). According to feminist political theorist Susan Moller
Okin, the multicultural exhortation to respect all cultures often conflicts with
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the liberal values of  freedom and gender equality, because some practices
and values of  cultural minorities are reinforcing inequality and violating
the rights of  women (
 

 
: 
 

 
). According to Okin, granting multicultural
rights to these minorities will perpetuate patriarchal cultures that subjugate
women. Okin’s position has triggered many reactions opposing the idea of
an intrinsic opposition between multiculturalism and feminism (Cohen 
 
et al
 
.
 

 
).
The growing critique voiced by actors with very different political posi-
tions has resulted in a retreat from multiculturalism as a policy goal in many
European countries in the late 
 

 
s (Modood 
 

 
; Joppke 
 

 
; Kofman
 

 
). September 
 

 
 and subsequent events (Bali, Casablanca, Istanbul,
Madrid, London) have given an impetus to this shift. The attacks on civilians
led to a widespread questioning about a presumed ‘clash of  civilizations’,
culminating in suspicions about the possibilities and willingness of  Muslims
to be integrated in ‘Western’ societies (Modood 
 

 
: 
 

 
). One reaction in
different parts of  Europe and the United States has been a reassertion of
national identity (Kofman 
 

 
: 
 

 
; Modood 
 

 
: 
 

 
) and stricter integra-
tion demands (Doomernik 
 

 
; Joppke 
 

 
).
The Netherlands is frequently mentioned as a clear example of  this policy
shift (Entzinger 
 

 
; Modood 
 

 
; Joppke 
 

 
; Kofman 
 

 
). In recent
Dutch integration measures it is stipulated that people must integrate and
understand the norms and values of  Dutch society. One of  the central values
defended as ‘Dutch’ is gender equality. Remarkable in this process is how
some political actors, who have never been strong advocates of  gender quality
before, now use the argument of  gender equality to reassert national identity
and place more restrictive demands upon immigrants and resident minorities.
As we will argue, migrant women have become an ‘emblematic’ policy
problem (Hajer 
 

 
) in the Netherlands. Unequal gender relations in minor-
ity groups (particularly among Muslims) are now seen as a core problem,
demonstrating the ‘backward’ character of  Islam and the gap between the
‘modern’ Dutch culture and the imported culture of  immigrants. This prob-
lem is principally located in men and a negative masculine culture. Contra-
dictions prevail when it comes to women. Migrant women are not only
represented as victims of  this misogynous culture, but – surprisingly – also
as the principal key to solving problems of  integration and emancipation.
This is because the emancipation of  migrant women is viewed as a crucial
step towards the emancipation of  the ‘migrant community’ in general.
In this article we analyse how and why gender has become the key issue
in policy frames on the integration of  ethnic minorities. We examine how a
parallel shift has occurred in Dutch gender equality policy to an almost
exclusive focus on migrant women or women from ethnic minorities. In
focusing on this double shift, we ask questions such as: What gendered cul-
tural practices are seen as a problem? What is the gender model that immi-
grants need to adapt to, and what is defined and promoted as a national
gender regime? To answer these questions, we reconstruct the policy frames
on gender and migration over the last decade, and investigate what actors
have been involved (which coalitions) in shifts in framing, what arguments
are used and what possible counter-arguments/frames can be traced?
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Reconstructing Policy Frames
 
The policy process is often a policy contest where the actors involved
compete over different definitions of  a problem (Hajer 
 

 
; Stone 
 

 
;
Bacchi 
 

 
). What is at stake in policy contests is what is represented as the
problem, and by whom, and the different assumptions that underpin these
representations. Some definitions of  issues are organized into politics
while other definitions are organized out, some aspects of  social reality are
included and others are left undiscussed (Hajer 
 

 
: 
 

 
–
 

 
). In the policy
process the actors involved give a particular shape to social problems in the
ways they speak about them and in the proposals advanced to address them
(Bacchi 
 

 
: 
 

 
). A careful analysis of  this process aims to understand the
ways in which a social problem is represented in the political domain, what
particular understanding gains dominance at some points and why, and what
understandings are discredited (Hajer 
 

 
: 
 

 
). Also, it is of  central
importance to examine which actors form a coalition on the basis of  a
certain policy representation.
To explore how the debate on migrant women has evolved and what
representations of  migrant women as a ‘policy problem’ have gained domi-
nance over time, we reconstruct the framing of  this issue within the political
arena. For this reconstruction we adopt insights from frame-analysis, an
approach that has mainly been used to study political communication, media
discourse and social movements, and more recently has been extended to
study policy-making processes. We use the concept of  framing to stress the
action component (Rein and Schön 
 

 
). Actors may ‘use competing or
convergent frames to (re)construct a specific cultural orientation which
favours and justifies their own policy position’ (Triandafyllidou and Fotiou
 

 
). Policy frames have several important political functions that may be
used deliberately and strategically by the different actors involved (Stone
 
: ): (a) challenging or protecting social order, (b) identifying causal
agents responsible for the problem, (c) legitimizing and empowering problem-
‘fixers’, and (d) creating new political alliances. In our understanding of
policy-framing, we do not see all framing in the political realm as strategic
and intentional.
The policy frame method seeks to discover dominant and/or competing
frames in the discourse of  political actors that make sense of  different situa-
tions and events, contribute blame or causality, and suggest lines of  action
(Rein and Schön ). Frame analysis can help identify how discursive
strategies – be they intentional or not – modify the process itself  by excluding
certain frames or actors and promoting others. We use a critical frame ana-
lysis approach (Verloo ) to reconstruct policy frames on migration and
gender, based on diverse methods of  frame analysis as developed to analyse
social movement framings (Snow and Benford ), policy texts (Graaf  and
Hoppe ) and gender impact assessment (Verloo and Roggeband ).
Snow and Benford () structure social movement frames according to
their definition of  the problem (diagnosis), the proposed solution to the prob-
lem (prognosis), and their call for action (who is responsible for solving the
problem). These elements of  frames can also be found in policy texts and
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debates. Within policy analysis, Van de Graaf  and Hoppe’s breakdown of
policy texts into their respective explicit and implicit causal, final and nor-
mative chains is particularly useful. Causal chains are the connections
between what is seen as a cause and what is seen as an effect of  a certain
policy problem. Final chains are the connections between what is defined as
goal and what as means to reach this goal. Normative chains are the con-
nections between various levels of  what is seen as right and what is seen as
wrong (Graaf  and Hoppe ). To analyse the dimension of  gender in the
framings, gender impact assessment (GIA), which distinguishes between
structures and processes of  gender inequalities, provides a useful framework
(Verloo and Roggeband ).
The above-mentioned elements of  diagnosis, prognosis, roles, causality,
normativity, finality and gender have been translated into an analytic frame-
work that consists of  a coding scheme with a set of  sensitizing questions on
each element (Verloo ). The first category is about voice or standing and
asks which actor speaks, on which occasion, to what audience or forum, and
in what form (interview, policy document, letter, essay, etc.). This element is
important to identify who is involved in the construction of  a new frame and
who supports this frame (frame-coalition). The second category of  diagnosis
asks what is represented as the problem, why it is seen as a problem, and
what is mentioned as causes of  the problem. It also analyses the attribution
of  roles in the diagnosis, such as who is seen to have made the problem, and
who is the problem-holder, who are possible victims and perpetrators. The
third category concerns the prognosis that contains what is represented as
the solution to the problem, what goals are formulated, how these goals
should be achieved. It also analyses the relationship between ends and means.
The fourth category is the call for action (or non-action), who is given a voice
in suggesting the course of  actions, who should act and who is acted upon.
These sensitizing questions are used to code different positions on the
above-mentioned dimensions for each analysed text, starting from the
assumption that different frames may be presented within one policy docu-
ment. The analytic tool helps to group ideas into policy frames that typically
differ in what is presented as the central problem or as solution to this
problem.
We take Snow and Benford’s concept of  strategic framing (), or frame-
alignment strategies, to analyse the evolution of  frames over time. Although
the state acts as one actor towards its citizens, it is by no means a monolithic
actor. The pluralism of  the state becomes visible in the policy-making process
when different, sometimes inconsistent or even excluding, frames may be
articulated within one policy document. The state is also a changing actor
over time as different coalitions may take office to govern the state. Snow
and Benford’s concept of  frame-alignment strategies, although originally
developed to analyse the dynamics between movements, audience and adver-
saries, can be usefully applied to analyse the dynamic nature of  framing by
the state. Frame-alignment strategies like frame-bridging, frame amplification,
frame extension and frame transformation, may be used by ruling govern-
ments either to stress a certain continuity in state policies, while looking for
policy change, or to suggest change even while doing business as usual.
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A reconstruction of  policy frames on gender and migration in the
Netherlands is complicated by the almost continuous shifts in policy labels and
categories. In the Netherlands, gender equality policies are called ‘emanci-
pation’ policies (emancipatiebeleid ), but in the s this policy was increasingly
called ‘diversity’ policy (diversiteitsbeleid ), so as to stress intersections with
ethnicity, class and sexuality. Policies directed at migrants have also been
labelled differently over time. In the s, they were called policies on
ethnic minorities (ethnische minderheden); in the s the new label became
integration policies (integratiebeleid ). Also, the label of  foreigners policy or
aliens policy is used in relation to regulations on entrance and permits.
Since then, migrant women have been labelled differently over time. In the
period under study the group has been referred to as ‘allochthonous’ women
(allochtone vrouwen); black, migrant and refugee women (zwarte, migranten- en
vluchtelingvrouwen); women from ethnic minorities (vrouwen uit etnische minderheden);
and non-Western immigrant women (niet-westerse migranten). These different
labels are meaningful as they each give a specific representation of  the group
and its characteristics.
The term most often used in policy texts and debates is that of  ‘alloch-
thonous’ women. Allochthonous literally means ‘different in relation to’ and is
used to distinguish migrants from the ‘autochthonous’ population. The label
‘allochthonous’ in the Dutch context means ‘of  foreign descent’ and implicitly
refers to mainly Moroccan and Turkish migrants and their offspring.
Second- and third-generation migrants, although often naturalized, are still
labelled allochthonous. In this article we alternatively use the policy label
allochthonous women and the internationally more common label of
migrant women, although we think that neither of  these labels is accurate to
describe the specific position or the rootedness of  these women in Dutch
society.
Political context and data
The data studied are policy documents and transcripts of  parliamentary
debates on the integration of  minorities and the emancipation of  women
between  and . In this period, four different coalitions governed.
From  until  the first ‘Purple’ cabinet took office, consisting of
the Social Democrats (PvdA), the Conservative Liberal Party (VVD), and the
Progressive Liberal Party (D’). This was the first Dutch cabinet after the
Second World War that did not include the Christian Democrats (CDA).
The Purple coalition continued for a second period from  to . In
, a new right-wing populist party (Lijst Pim Fortuyn [LPF], named after
its murdered charismatic leader) entered the Dutch electoral arena after a
major victory in the elections. This party formed a coalition with the
Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party, headed by Prime Minister
Balkenende, which only lasted for  days. In the following elections, the LPF
lost votes and a new centre-right coalition of  CDA, VVD, and D’ took
office in May .
The texts were selected to include all relevant policy shifts addressing migrant
women. Gender equality policies, as developed in the Netherlands from 
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onwards, only marginally addressed the issue of  migration and ethnicity before
. One important exception to this was the so called VEM (women and
minorities) projects that ran between  and . These projects aimed
to improve the labour market participation of  women from ethnic minorities.
In the period under study,  to , most gender equality programmes
did not include separate chapters, paragraphs or references to ethnicity,
migration or integration. The  policy plan ‘Emancipation under construc-
tion’ marginally addresses migrant women. In the  policy report there is
a paragraph on ethnicity and gender. The gender equality policy documents
issued in ,  and  do not contain a separate chapter or paragraph
on ethnicity, migration or integration and were therefore not selected for our
analysis. The policy programmes of  ,  and , on the other hand,
do include separate paragraphs on migrant women. The programmes
discuss the opportunities and obstacles that these women face when participat-
ing in labour and politics. A special action plan concerning migrant women,
requested by the Parliament, was presented in . Both this plan and the
parliamentary debate on this plan are included in our analysis.
Parallel to this, the older policy programmes and yearly reports on ethnic minorities
only occasionally addressed women. The minority reports of  ,  and
 include separate chapters on the emancipation of  black, migrant and
refugee women. The , ,  and  reports do not address women
from ethnic minorities separately. In March  the Directorate responsible
for integration and minorities moved from the Ministry of  Internal Affairs to
the Ministry of  Justice. In the same year a special action plan concerning
migrant women, in cooperation with the Minister for Equality Policies, was
developed, and a high-profile commission to stimulate the participation of
migrant women was installed (Commission Rosenmöller or PaVEM).
In this article we first examine which frames have dominated in the policy
documents on migration and emancipation of  the different governments that
were in office between  and . We also look at alternative frames
presented by other actors involved in the political debate on these issues.
Then we take a closer look at the changes over time in the different elements
of  policy frames: diagnosis, prognosis and call for action. Finally, we analyse
how the dominant problem representations affect migrant women as the central
subject of  these policies, and present some ideas to understand the changes
that have been found.
The Evolution of  Dutch Policy Frames on Gender 
and Migration
–: stressing the value of  diversity
Policy frames on integration and emancipation presented by the two Purple
Coalitions echo a rhetoric of  multiculturalism. In the proposed policies cultural
diversity is presented as a source of  richness for society: 
In the conviction that optimal use of  the existent social diversity will enhance
the quality of  society, social diversity as a source of  quality is taken as
©  The Author(s) 
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the point of  departure for emancipation policy. (TK , no. : 
[references to deliberations in Parliament are listed in the Appendix])
This accent on diversity as a quality is introduced as a new orientation of
emancipation policy: ‘the emphasis has shifted from the backward position
of  (groups of ) women to the recognition of  the value of  diversity for society
as a whole’ (TK , nos –: ). Multiculturalism is also formulated as
a goal in migration policy. The ‘Integration Policy Plan –’ states:
There is nothing wrong with expressing the hope and expectation that
our society is becoming a multicultural society . . . The government does
not have the right to deprive minorities from expressing their cultures.
In integration policy it should be recognized that our society has
become multicultural and that this bears its consequence, also and more
fundamentally for our democratic state. (TK –, , no. : )
The emphasis on diversity and multiculturalism appears to be ambivalent.
While the authorities want to recognize the value of  cultural difference, they see
the ‘diverse’ population groups mainly in terms of  a range of  social problems
(poverty, unemployment, low educational level). Migrant women are presented
as not being as emancipated and ‘advanced’ as ‘Dutch’ women and should
therefore change in order to be more similar to the autochthonous popula-
tion. In contrast to the multicultural rhetoric ‘different backgrounds’, ‘different
perspectives’ and ‘diverse cultures’ are mentioned by the government not as
sources of  advantage or wealth, but rather as sources of  disadvantage.
During this period there is little political contestation between the different
political parties over the dominant multicultural frame. Typically, the Minis-
ter responsible for Minority Policies, Dijkstal (VVD), notes that ‘we all agree
that minorities should be given the perspective of  full participation in society
and that pluriformity, mutual respect, and maintenance of  cultural identity,
solidarity, tolerance and integration should be the core concepts of  our
policy’ (HTK –,  , no. : ). The parliamentary committee for
minority policy focuses strongly on labour market participation, education
and delinquency as policy issues and pays little attention to migrant women
as a specific target group. Left-wing parliamentarians within the gender
equality committee instead emphasize the difficulty migrant women have in
accessing the labour market.
Overall, migrant women are not yet an important policy subject in this
period; various measures are proposed to stimulate their participation in
labour and decision-making, but no structural policies are developed to
improve their position. The dominant government frame is a participation
frame, with the (left) opposition stressing problems of  access.
–: diversity becomes problematic
At the end of  the s, two other frames emerge in the policy documents
presented by the Purple II cabinet. These can respectively be characterized
as a restriction frame, which focuses on how a wave of  new immigrants
 ©  The Author(s)
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through marriages can be prevented, and a vulnerablility frame that seeks to
protect legally migrant women who have dependent residence permits but
seek to leave their violent partner. These frames emerge when discussing a
proposal for a new law on the integration of  migrants. This law, which came
into force on  September , obliges immigrants to undergo an assess-
ment when applying for a residence permit. This assessment determines
which programme the migrant should follow to get a permit. The settling
programme consists of  three parts: Dutch language, orientation on Dutch
society (including gender relations), and orientation on the labour market. In
the parliamentary debates on this bill it becomes clear that the immigration
issue causes considerable tension within the Purple Coalition. This is parti-
cularly visible when the legal position of  women is discussed. While the left
(PvdA) emphasizes the vulnerability of  women who legally depend on their
partner, and advocates a less restrictive law that gives women an independent
permit after three years of  marriage, in case of  decease of  the partner, or in
case of  violence, the right (VVD) wants to discourage the entrance of  new
migrant women as marriage partners. They fear that a more permissive law
will result in more abuse of  the law. This position is shared by the Christian
Democrats (CDA) in opposition, who even argue that the period of  depend-
ence should be prolonged from three to five years, as it was in the old law
(TK ,  June ).
A contrasting frame, in which the emphasis is on emancipation of
migrants, appears to be present in the constitution of  Commission AVEM in
. The focus of  this committee is to study the issue of  labour market
participation of  women from ethnic minority groups and to develop policy
initiatives to stimulate their participation. In line with this participation
frame, there is a growing criticism by mainly left-wing MPs within the gen-
der equality committee (and partly also within the committee on integration
policy) of  the lack of  structural policies to improve the position of  migrant
women, resonating with the earlier access frame. PvdA MP Bussemaker urges
the state secretary to develop specific policies to stimulate the participation
of  migrant women (HTK,  , no. ); she fears this group will be ignored
by both gender equality and integration policy. The state secretary responds
to this petition by sending an inventory of  cabinet policy for allochthonous
women to Parliament in March  (SZW–), which according to her
demonstrates that sufficient measures are taken.1
Another remarkable shift is how the Liberal Party VVD starts to draw
attention to cultural obstacles to integration, more specifically obstacles in
Islamic culture: ‘Traditional roles predominate within allochthonous families.
In certain Islamic cultures boys are placed on a pedestal. In these cases we
need an extra change of  culture’ (VVD MP Weekers, HTK, –,
 , no. : ).
In the late s there was a growing political divide between left- and
right-wing parties in relation to the issues of  immigration and integration,
with the centre party CDA siding with the right. During this period migrant
women become politicized, both as vulnerable subjects in migration law, and
as a group that needs more specific measures to increase its participation in
society. The emphasis is no longer on the added value of  migrant women to
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increase social diversity, but instead migrant women become a social prob-
lem, framed as having a problematic culture by the right and centre parties, and
as having an access problem by the left.
–: a neo-liberal approach to migration
The coalitions Balkenende I and II mark an important change in the Dutch
political landscape. During the parliamentary elections of   populist
politician Pim Fortuyn and his party Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) won much
support with their critique of  Dutch integration policies (Doomernik : ).
The LPF joined the Balkenende I government (with Liberal and Christian
Democratic coalition partners), focusing on the explicit policy goal of  changing
existing immigration and integration policies. This government soon ended
with new elections, and the LPF did not join the Balkenende II cabinet that was
built on the basis of  a Liberal/Christian Democrat coalition. The new govern-
ment continued the former coalition’s effort to reform integration policies.
The Balkenende I and II governments emphasize the individual responsibility
of  migrants to emancipate and criticize earlier integration policies that define
multiculturalism as a central value.
For a long time integration policies have put too much emphasis on the
acceptation of  differences between minorities and the autochthonous
population. Nothing is wrong with that, but often this was understood
as if  the presence of  foreign ethnic groups represented an inherent
value, an enrichment tout court [emphasis in original text]. This means
that one loses sight of  the fact that not everything that is different
therefore is valuable. (TK , no. )
According to the Balkenende II cabinet, former minority policies failed to
integrate minorities into Dutch society. This conclusion is drawn before the
special Parliamentary Research Commission,2 appointed to evaluate minority
policies, published its findings. It is remarkable how the blame for this failure
is attributed to former governments – neglecting the participation of  two of
the coalition partners (VVD and D’) in these governments. The proposed
solution is not to reorganize the principal agent, the state, but to withdraw
the state as an active player in integration policy.
Integration policies run the risk of  treating minorities as a category that
needs care. The accent then is too much on providing facilities, provi-
sion and arrangements. The cabinet is determined to change this
course . . . The cabinet wants to stress that citizens, civil organizations
and institutions themselves should be held responsible for their integra-
tion. (TK , no. )
The citizens referred to as primarily responsible for solving the problems of
integration are the migrant citizens. The government seeks to stimulate
integration no longer through specific policies or stimulating measures, but
through demands and obligations on migrants.
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In this period a joint plan of  the Minister of  Social Affairs and Employ-
ment and the Minister of  Foreigners’ Affairs and Integration is launched to
address the emancipation of  women and girls from ethnic minorities. This
plan links emancipation to integration and puts increasing emphasis on
socio-cultural obstacles to integration and participation. The cultural herit-
age and religion (Islam) of  migrants are increasingly mentioned as an essen-
tial part of  the problem. The imported culture of  migrants is associated with
unequal gender relations, and with violence as a means to reinforce this
inequality, notably with honour killings, domestic violence and forced
marriages (Minister Verdonk, HTK, –, , no. : ).
Accentuated by a similar move in integration policy, where migrant
women are seen as the key to the integration of  minorities, migrant women
become the central subject of  gender equality policy. As a result, minority
policies become gendered, whereas emancipation policies become ‘ethnicized’.
The dominant framing that focuses strongly on issues of  culture and reli-
gion is backed by the right-wing parties VVD and LPF, and to a lesser extent
CDA. VVD Parliamentarian Hirsi Ali states that: ‘the largest obstacle that
women from ethnic minorities find on their way to emancipation and inte-
gration is so-called culturally legitimized violence’ (TK ,  March :
–). Minister Verdonk acts as an important coalition partner in Hirsi
Ali’s struggle to put the issue of  ‘culturally legitimized violence’ on the polit-
ical agenda. Interestingly, Hirsi Ali’s framing, which largely coincides with
the dominant government framing, is increasingly contested by other female
allochthonous parliamentarians of  more leftist parties. MPs Azough (Groen
Links) and Koser-Kaya (D’) criticize the almost exclusive focus on culture
and urge the government to change its focus again to socio-economic par-
ticipation of  migrant women and discrimination as a central obstacle to
participation (TK ,  April ).
From  onwards, migrant women have been at the top of  the political
agenda. Interestingly, it has been mainly left-wing parties that have urged
more attention to the position of  allochthonous women and specific policies
directed at them, but it is right-wing parties that have determined the direc-
tion of  these policies. Rather than the leftist emphasis on labour market
participation, cultural change is now the key issue.
As we argue below, rather than a radical shift in framings, the changes
could be labelled as frame extension. Migrant women were already defined
as a policy problem, with an emphasis on their socio-economic position, but
this problem is amplified by adding a cultural dimension. This amplification
of  the diagnosis is accompanied by a new neo-liberal master frame that, as we
will see, has important implications for the proposed solution or prognosis.
A Closer Look at the Changing Debate
Amplification of  diagnosis
The central problem as defined between  and  is changing from a
mainly social structural problem – that focuses on the ‘backward’ position of
migrant women in education, labour market participation, social security
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and childcare – towards a more and more strictly cultural problem, where
Muslim culture is defined as an obstacle to the emancipation of  migrants,
and hence, as a problem in Dutch society.
Discrimination is hardly mentioned as a problem, nor are Dutch society
and culture presented as problematic for migrants. In , the Purple II
coalition states that ‘in general, Dutch society has incorporated new popula-
tions from different cultural circles well. Social tensions have not occurred’
(TK , no. : ). In , the Balkenende II cabinet is far more pessi-
mistic about this incorporation: ‘there is a social and cultural gap between
minorities and the autochthonous population that is difficult to bridge’ (TK
, no. : ). However, it is mainly the migrant population that is held
responsible for bridging the gap. The autochthonous Dutch population is
only marginally seen as a target group, in that it should get more acquainted
with minorities and learn more about their culture in order to reduce pre-
judices that may hinder integration of  migrants. The Balkenende II cabinet
aims to stimulate cross-cultural dialogue. However, only the minority popu-
lation is expected to reduce cultural differences and assimilate to Dutch
standards and values.
In policy documents issued between  and  migrant women
become a ‘growing problem’. Until , the central problem is defined as
the lagging behind of  migrant women in labour market participation, which
results in limited access to decision-making, economic and social resources
and dependence on the social security system. In a later phase, principally
from  onwards, new problems are added. Minister Verdonk mentions
traditionalism and the lack of  social participation which makes migrant
women invisible in society, as barriers to emancipation (Speech on  September
). The policy plan for the integration and emancipation of  migrant
women and girls highlights (domestic) violence, forced marriages, honour
killings, trafficking and isolation as problems affecting the position of  migrant
women.
In sum, rather than a shift in the definition of  the problem, there is an
extension of  the problem: a cultural dimension has been added to a pre-
existing socio-economic problem definition.
As the problem of  migrant women is amplified, the definition of  the origin
of  the problem shifts from individual causes – such as knowledge/education
and language skills – and socio-economic causes like mechanisms in the
labour market, to cultural causes – mainly a traditional culture that privi-
leges men and subordinates women, and legitimizes violence. By increasingly
defining religious and cultural practices, but also intimate relationships and
the sexuality of  ethnic minorities as problematic, the government suggests
that it is not primarily structural conditions of  Dutch society that hinder the
participation of  migrants, but rather the organization of  the sphere of  inti-
macy within the migrant community.
This suggests a reversal of  the causal logic in the problem definition.
Whereas until  social and economic integration was defined as the pre-
condition for cultural integration, a new causal mechanism is proposed in
which cultural integration is a necessary precondition for full social and
economic integration.
 ©  The Author(s)
Journal compilation ©  Blackwell Publishing Ltd
S P & A, V. , N. , J 
As the problem of  ‘migrant women’ grows, the problem of  the emancipa-
tion of  ‘Dutch’ women dissolves. Whereas in early emancipation policies,
Dutch men were the implicit norm for the emancipation and participation
of  Dutch women, migrant women become the new group of  reference. In
the earlier emancipation frames Dutch women were lagging behind men (in
labour market participation and decision-making); the new frame instead
stresses the advanced position of  Dutch women, compared to migrant
women. This change in focus even makes the government (Balkenende II)
conclude that emancipation of  Dutch’ women is accomplished. The ‘liber-
ated’ Dutch woman becomes the norm and role model for the ‘traditional’
migrant woman. Simultaneously, the non-participation or low participation
of  autochthonous women is neglected or not seen as a problem, as their
dependence is on their partner and not on the state. The emancipation of
Dutch men (attention to a stronger role for men in family care responsibili-
ties) also, implicitly, seems to have disappeared from the policy agenda.
Instead, migrant men surface as a new target group, although no concrete
measures at all are formulated to stimulate their emancipation at all. Migrant
women are seen as the primary responsible persons for the emancipation of
allochthonous men (and children): ‘If  you educate a woman, you educate a
family’ (PaVEM Commission  [available at http://www.ageplus.nl/
downloads/AGEplusworkshopPAVEMcommission.ppt]).
Shrinking prognosis
While the diagnosis is extended, the prognosis or proposed solution shrinks.
In the multicultural frame, and in the restriction and victimization frames,
the state figures as the principal change agent during the period –,
but in the individual responsibility frame, promoted by the Balkenende II
government, migrants are held primarily responsible for their integration. In
line with neo-liberal thinking, the government no longer opts for welfare
state measures and anti-discrimination policies to promote integration.
Instead, stricter demands are placed on immigrants to learn the language,
accept a common political culture and respect values labelled ‘Dutch’, such
as tolerance, gender equality and freedom of  expression.
In the policy frame of  the right-wing Balkenende II coalition the special
emphasis is on (Muslim) women who are put forward both as principal
policy targets and principal agents of  change. This change of  perspective is
most clearly voiced by the Minister for Integration, Verdonk, who argues
that ‘migrant women must reproduce the steps taken by autochthonous
women to emancipate’. This representation of  Dutch autochthonous women
as having emancipated themselves, neglects the extensive state support for
this group since the s. Implicitly, the achievement of  autochthonous
women is attributed to individual efforts rather than to any active interven-
tion by the state. This allows allocating a duty to allochthonous women to
emancipate themselves also, without any duty on the state to support them.
The state thereby withdraws its responsibility to solve the problem.
The range of  goals also shifts. Whereas in earlier policy documents
goals were mainly formulated in the realms of  labour market participation,
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decision-making and education, in the  ‘Action plan on women and girls
from ethnic minorities’ only two of  the seven goals address labour market
participation and education. The other aims focus on cultural obstacles such
as forced marriages, genital mutilation, honour killings, sexual relationships,
and the emancipation of  migrant men, instead of  socio-structural barriers for
participation, and do not involve substantial resources.
In the evolution of  frames there is a convergence of  individualization
and ‘culturalization’ of  the central problem, resulting in inconsistent policy.
The individual is responsible for the problem, but also the culture is respon-
sible. In this tension, it remains unclear how the individual should or could
change a dominant culture. The means are increasingly symbolic measures
like consciousness-raising and dialogue. There is an inconsistency between
the goals formulated, on the one hand, and how the problems are constructed,
on the other. For example, while the government aims to fight negative
stereotypes, it simultaneously reproduces and actively constructs stereotypes
like that of  the subordinate migrant woman. While stimulating dialogue
between migrant and ‘Dutch’ women, the government actively (re)produces
dichotomies between women. Another example of  such inconsistency is the
emphasis on the individual responsibility of  migrants for their emancipation,
while at the same time prescribing the norms of  emancipation.
Migrant women: the creation of  a homogeneous category
At the end of  the s, the definition of  migrant women in emancipation
policy texts not only includes Turkish and Moroccan women, but also
Surinamese, Antillean and refugee women, and differences in cultural
background, age, socio-economic position, and in available resources are
acknowledged (see, for instance, ‘Emancipation under construction’, HTK
, no. ). Implicitly, however, the policy almost exclusively focuses on
women of  Turkish and Moroccan descent. In later frames these women are
equated with Muslim women. Moroccan and Turkish women, and later
Muslim women, are labelled as having the most ‘backward’ position com-
pared to ‘Dutch’ or autochthonous women, who represent the reference
group. Other migrant women from Surinamese or Antillean descent are
increasingly seen as ‘more advanced’ in their participation. In this sense
the category of  migrant women is shrinking. The category of  Dutch women
apparently cannot include allochthonous women, even if  they are born in
the Netherlands or have Dutch nationality, installing a dichotomy where
neither of  the two opposing groups is clearly defined, but where the Dutch-
ness of  women from Turkish and Moroccan descent is denied.
Special attention is paid to new migrants who marry someone of  Turkish
or Moroccan descent living in the Netherlands. Although both women and
men of  Moroccan and Turkish descent marry partners from Morocco or
Turkey, far more attention is paid to new female migrants who enter the
Netherlands as a consequence of  their marriage. Apparently, the problem is
gendered. ‘Imported brides’ are perceived as a problem, whereas ‘imported
grooms’ receive only scant attention. Imported brides are labelled as even more
‘backward’ than allochthonous women who have lived in the Netherlands for
 ©  The Author(s)
Journal compilation ©  Blackwell Publishing Ltd
S P & A, V. , N. , J 
some time already, referring to their low educational level, their difficult
access to the labour market, their poor language skills and poor knowledge
of  Dutch cultural norms. Their marginal participation on the labour market
may result in economic dependence on the Dutch state, which implicitly
appears to be one of  the central problems concerning migration.
Within the category of  ‘Dutch’ or autochthonous women few distinctions
are made, mainly their labour participation and independence from the
welfare system are brought forward as the norm for the participation of
migrant women. Paradoxically, in the debate on migration and integration,
equal gender relations are represented as a key characteristic of  Dutch
identity and culture, whereas in reality traditional gender arrangements
(breadwinner/caretaker roles) still hold strong in the Netherlands. Only 
per cent of  Dutch women between  and  are economically independent,
predominantly as a result of  part-time work.
In sum, the category of  migrant or ‘allochthonous’ women is gradually
reduced to that of  Muslim women, mainly Moroccan and Turkish women.
Within these categories remarkably few distinctions are made. Migrant
women are generally presented as rather traditional, poorly educated and
passive. Some exceptions to this rule are mentioned and put forward as role
models, but overall there is very little attention to the heterogeneity of  the
group. Differences in age, class, education, cultural and religious orienta-
tions, ambitions, lifestyle or choices, are not made visible.
Explaining the politicization of  migrant women
How can we understand that migrant women have become such an emblem-
atic policy ‘problem’ in the Netherlands? We suggest that the institutional
context, more specifically the prevalent citizenship and migration regime and
gender regime, may provide an explanation.
At the end of  the twentieth century, the Dutch citizenship regime was a
civic territorial one where migrants had fairly easy access to citizenship, and
a culturally pluralist regime where the cultural and religious institutions of
migrants were publicly recognized and supported (Koopmans et al. ).
To an important extent, the institutional framework for integration and
multicultural rights in the Netherlands is based on the heritage of  pillariza-
tion (the segmentation of  Dutch society along confessional lines originally
intended to accommodate conflicts between different native religious groups,
and extended to Muslims). Immigrants were targeted as a group and the
government facilitated self-organization of  immigrants along ethnic and reli-
gious lines with access to the state in a corporatist system of  advisory bodies
(Koopmans et al. : ; Doomernik ).
At the start of  the new millennium some important regime changes were
made. In April , a new Aliens Law restricted the admission of  new
immigrants and asylum-seekers (Doomernik ). Since , a new law on
Dutch Citizenship has introduced stricter criteria of  integration. Whereas
previously integration was first and foremost related to employment and
education, at present it is more about loyalties and making an unequivocal
choice for Dutch society by giving up dual nationality (Doomernik : ).
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Measures like a compulsory integration course for immigrants are thought
to help integration and to ensure loyalty to the central values of  Dutch
society. The focus on cultural integration as a prerequisite for social and
economic integration has facilitated the attention to gender relations within
ethnic groups. Some gendered cultural and religious practices of  ethic
minorities, e.g. arranged marriages, sex-segregated education and veiling, are
seen as conflicting with liberal ‘Western’ values. Gender relations are at the
centre of  this apparent value conflict. Since women are often represented as
symbols of  racial and ethnic boundaries and as guardians of  specific cultural
and ethnic traditions (Yuval-Davis and Anthias ), this may explain the
policy shift to women as a central problem and as important agents of
cultural change in minority policies.
The Dutch gender regime can be characterized as a male-breadwinner,
female-caregiver model that has gradually moved to a ‘. model’ in which
one partner combines caregiving with a part-time job. Recent policy meas-
ures take the family income as a point of  departure, while diminishing the
individual social security rights of  those who depend on this family income.
Women who lose their breadwinner have an economically very weak posi-
tion. Since migrant women have an even higher rate of  economic depend-
ence and lower levels of  labour market participation, gender equality policies
have also targeted this group since the s. Since , the implicit frame
of  the government has been that autochthonous women have accomplished
gender equality, but that allochthonous women still do not fit into the Dutch
gender model. This frame has put migrant women centre-stage in gender
equality policies. In accordance with the Dutch ‘. model’, both their roles
as earners and caregivers (and educators of  their families) are central in these
new policies.
The shifts that put migrant women at the centre of  both integration and
gender equality policies can also be explained in a classic way as the result
of  a shift from a government including the left to a centre-right government.
The position of  the right (VVD) fits strategically both with neo-liberal frames
of  ‘restricting’ state intervention and (nationalist) positions opposing immi-
gration. For the Christian Democrats their position on gender equality has
always been ambivalent, as they are the party mostly stressing ‘family values’.
The shift to ethnicizing gender equality policies eliminated the need for them
to give attention to gender equality among their own constituency.
However, as our analysis shows, party dominance in government only
provides a partial explanation, because even when the left was a coalition-
partner, the restriction frames were already present, and the alternative
access and vulnerability frames were weak. Moreover, the left parties have
been inconsistent advocates of  gender equality since the s, when they
abolished their own women’s organization. On migration issues, the left also
hosts a wide set of  opinions, ranging from a shrinking group of  adherents of
multiculturalism to a growing group in favour of  restriction. In the dynamics
between the parties, the few voices from the left advocating more attention
for migrant women were successful in getting this attention, but lacking a
strongly articulated party position, they were unable to decide on the direc-
tion of  the policies that resulted from this. Rather, the unexpected result was
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that gender equality policies were emptied out in terms of  content, target
groups and resources, and that migrant women became the emblematic
group responsible not only for their own emancipation but for the integra-
tion of  a whole category of  migrants.
Conclusions
As our reconstruction of  Dutch minority and gender equality policies dem-
onstrates, there are two major shifts in these policies. Minority and integra-
tion policies change from degendered to gendered policies, where unequal
gender relations become a core focus of  attention. Emancipation policies in
the same period have become ‘ethnicized’, focusing primarily on the eman-
cipation of  allochthonous women. In these policies, Muslim women are
singled out as a group in particular need of  emancipation. While migrant
women long remained invisible as the wives and daughters of  immigrant
workers, Dutch society and politics have recently discovered them as the
other ‘other’ and placed new demands upon them. It is argued by policy-
makers that since women are principally responsible for taking care of  and
educating their children, it is mainly the women that can and should educate
their family towards (cultural) change. This gives migrant women a special
place in governmental policies and suggests that the practices of  Muslim
women might create an important bridge between liberal citizenship and
Muslim identity.
The dominant frames of  modernization and individual responsibility
are reinforcing a dichotomy between the autochthonous ‘us’ and the
allochthonous ‘them’. As the problem is more and more defined as a cultural
one, it is implicitly stated that there is no problem with the dominant culture
and society. Attention has shifted from structural to cultural barriers to
participation, and these cultural barriers are exclusively located in the
migrant (Muslim) culture. This means that Muslim migrants should first
change their culture before they can fully integrate and participate in Dutch
society.
Moreover, the dominant framing also reinforces existing power rela-
tions. The specific framing in Dutch policies creates and reproduces social
dichotomies and oppositions between Dutch and ‘others’, between men
and women, and between traditional (Muslim) and modern (‘Western’)
cultures. These categories are clearly asymmetric in power and status. Also,
presenting migrant women as a problem allows the government to take the
role of  well-intentioned helper of  these women. The government, however,
limits itself  to formulating criteria and demands in relation to migrant
women, without granting them the necessary resources or access, or remov-
ing obstacles to participation. As a result, the state becomes a paternalistic
but powerless player that limits itself  to a restrictive, but no longer proactive,
role.
The negative representations of  migrant women as traditional, backward
and (potentially) victims may limit the discursive opportunities for identifica-
tion and participation of  migrant women, and thus may have the opposite
effect from what government aims to accomplish.
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Appendix: Primary Sources
Notes
. Available at: http://docs.szw.nl/pdf///___.pdf
. This Commission was charged with answering a question that had been raised in
a parliamentary debate in  by the Socialist Party (SP), namely, why immigrant
integration in the Netherlands had failed. Its main conclusion was that minority
policies have not failed completely and that younger generations are far more
integrated into Dutch society than first-generation migrants.
Policy text/title of  debate No.
. Emancipation Policy : Emancipation 
under construction
 no. 
. Act integration newcomers,  April  , no. 
. Minority Policy . Annual report 
[Chapter : Black, migrant and refugee 
women in emancipation policy]
, no. 
. Integration policy – , no. 
. Report Integration policy ethnic minorities 
 [Chapter : Black, migrant and refugee 
women in emancipation policy]
, no. 
. The legal position of  women in immigration 
policy. Letter of  the State Secretary of  Justice, 
April 
, no. 
. The legal position of  women in immigration 
policy. Report of  a general parliamentary 
meeting, meeting year –, June 
, no. 
. Speech by minister Verdonk at the starting 
conference of  the Commission Rosenmöller, 
 September 
. Report on the Integration Policy of  Ethnic 
Minorities . Integration policy new style. 
, no. 
. Plan for the emancipation and integration of  
women and girls form ethnic minorities. 
Letter of  the ministers of  Social Affairs and 
Employment and of  Immigration and 
Integration,  October 
, no. 
. Speech by minister de Geus: Migrants central 
in new phase emancipation policy,  
November 
. Parliamentary debate on the emancipation of  
ethnic minorities,  March 
 no.  and no.  en 
. Parliamentary debate on religious manifestations 
of  civil servants,  March 
. Law on prevention of  marriages of  convenience   no. 
. Emancipation monitor  , no. 
. Parliamentary debate assistance for women at 
risk (honour killings),  February 
TK , --
. Plan domestic violence Report ethnic Minorities   no. 
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